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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

11 Feb 67

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (16 Mar 67) FOR OT

22 March 1967

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
2d Battalion (175MM) (SP), 32d Artillery (U) - (8)

12 18p.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

9 Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2D Battalion (175MM)(SP), 32D Artillery dated 1 February 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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2D BATTALION (175MM)(SP), 32D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96353

AVGE-2

1 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSECR-65)(U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
APO 96289

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVTB-FA-J
APO 96277

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel

a. Normal S-1 activities have been conducted during the period

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1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967.

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b. Authorized and Proposed TOE Strength:

UNIT	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery	15	1	127	0	0	.0
Battery A	5	0	104	0	0	+4
Battery B	5	0	104	0	0	+4
Battery C	5	0	104	0	0	+4
Service Battery	2	3	79	0	0	0
TOTALS	32	4	518	0	0	+12

c. Assigned and present for duty strength as of 31 January 1967:

UNIT	ASSIGNED			PRESENT FOR DUTY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery	17	1	154	13	0	119
Battery A	5	0	119	4	0	106
Battery B	5	0	108	4	0	116
Battery C	5	0	110	4	1	122
Service Battery	2	3	96	2	2	82
TOTALS	34	4	584	27	3	558

d. The difference in assigned and present for duty strength shown in paragraph 1c above resulted principally from the fact that Headquarters and Headquarters Battery carries personnel assigned but in transit. The battalion metro section is assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery but attached to Battery C. Similarly, the battalion personnel section, assigned to Service Battery, is attached to Service Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, as part of the 23d Artillery Group Personnel Section. Other variations are due to normal absenteeism resulting from leave, R & R and hospital.

e. Throughout the period of 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967, MOS shortages have resulted due to personnel rotations. MOSs most effected were 94B20 (cooks), 76K40 (supply sergeants), and 63C40 (track vehicle mechanics). These shortages, although critical for a period of time, have been subsequently

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3 relieved through normal replacements.

f. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

GAINS:	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	LOSSES:	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
	2	0	64		4	0	7

g. Casualties included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in Action	0
Wounded in Action	0
Missing in Action	0
Non battle dead	2
Non battle casualties	0

h. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Air Medal (Merit)	3
Commendation Medal	4

NOTE: In addition to these awards, 15 recommendations for award have been submitted and are pending approval by USARV.

i. R & R Program schedules include the following:

(1) The in-country R & R consisting of 3 day passes to Vung Tau has been utilized by 10 personnel.

(2) The out of country R & R included the following 5 day quotas:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	5	4	6	15
Tokyo	8	7	6	21
Manila	2	2	1	5
Hong Kong	6	5	6	17
Taipei	7	5	7	19
Singapore	1	1	1	3
Kuala Lumpur	1	1	0	2
Penang	3	2	2	7
Hawaii	2	5	7	14
TOTALS	35	32	36	103

j. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. APO numbers for the units are as follows:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO</u>
Headquarters Battery	96353
Battery A	96353
Battery B	96289
Battery C	96256
Service Battery	96353

k. Judicial actions by unit: included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
Headquarters Battery	10	2	0	0
Battery A	11	1	0	0
Battery B	5	1	0	0
Battery C	3	0	0	0
Service Battery	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	31	4	0	0

l. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	640
Admitted to hospital	6
Evacuated within the country	2
Evacuated out of country	1
Malaria cases	0

m. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Headquarters Battery	1	0	0
Battery A	0	0	0
Battery B	1	0	0
Battery C	1	0	0
Service Battery	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	5	0	0

n. The morale of the command is outstanding. This is evidenced by the fact that twenty-six personnel took advantage of the six-month extension program during the reporting quarter.

o. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by 25th Division educational services and USAFI extension courses.

p. Religious Services; Protestant and Catholic Services are held on a regular weekly schedule. Other denominations attend services that are announced in the 25th Division Daily Bulletin.

q. The VD rate within the battalion has not presented a serious

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problem as evidenced by no appreciable rate increase during the quarter. Battery commanders, with the assistance of the battalion surgeon, present frequent orientations and lectures on personnel hygiene and prophylactic usage. This has been found to be an effective approach to the problem of venereal disease.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General activities.

(1) During this reporting period the S2 section conducted CBR and SAEDA classes for all units within the battalion. CBR classes emphasized individual care and cleaning of the M17 protective mask, toxic chemical agents and the first aid to be taken upon contacting them. Protective masks were also fitted. SAEDA briefings were conducted in accordance with AR 381-12.

(2) Orientation flights were given to all officers and key NCOs of the battalion. The purpose of these flights is to familiarize the individual with the surrounding area so he is able to adjust artillery fires if the need arises.

(3) The S2 section supervised the clearing of bushes and tall grass from between the barriers on the perimeter. The completion of this job aided the physical security of the perimeter by improving observation from the bunkers.

(4) The S2 section reviewed and updated the Battalion's Security SOP and the SDO, SDNCO/SOG Instructions. A Physical Security Plan as outlined by USARV Reg 380-4 was also formulated.

(5) An Intelligence self briefing map is being maintained by the S2 section. Intelligence activity occurring during the day is plotted on the map and numbered. Intelligence briefing cards are cross referenced with map locations and describe the events which occur. A situation map is also maintained with the latest known or suspected enemy locations.

b. During the Annual General Inspection given to the Battalion by the USARV Inspector General on 19-23 December 1966, the handling and safeguarding of classified documents was considered adequate.

c. Aerial Surveillance.

(1) The visual reconnaissance area of responsibility has been changed to conform with terrain features. Each observer was assigned a specific portion of the battalion area in the same manner.

(2) Briefing of observers has been considerably improved by sending instructions to the observer with the pilot. The instructions may be verbal or written, depending on the complexity. Debriefing of observers assigned to distant batteries is effectively accomplished by debriefing check-

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lists. These are completed immediately upon landing and given to the pilot. Debriefing of observers located at Cu Chi is accomplished in person.

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(3) Total hours flown by the battalion's aircraft:

	<u>01-D</u>	<u>OH-13</u>
November	121	80
December	198	77
January	184	74

3. (U) Training and Organization.

a. On the job training and individual cross training continues in all units.

b. Replacement training is now available to all batteries through the major unit nearest them. Headquarters, Service and A Batteries now send personnel to the 25th Infantry Division Replacement Training Center at Cu Chi. Battery B continues to send personnel to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division course at Lai Khe. Battery C has begun training replacements with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade at Tay Ninh.

c. During the reporting period officer training continued in firing battery, gunnery, maintenance and supply procedures. Tests were administered to battery officers covering firing battery and gunnery techniques.

d. The following periods of mandatory training for personnel were conducted during the reporting period:

- (1) Armed Forces Censorship: 1 hour
- (2) CBR Refresher: 4 hours
- (3) Command Information: 13 hours
- (4) Defense Against Subversion and Espionage: 1 hour
- (5) Familiarization Firing of Individual Weapons: 4 hours
- (6) Drivers' Training: 3 hours

e. The following courses of instruction were attended as indicated:

(1) On 5 November 1966, six personnel attended a projectionist school at the Audio/Visual Section of the 69th Signal Battalion.

(2) Nine personnel attended the 25th Infantry Division School which presented courses as follows: Small Arms Inspection, Generator Operator, Military Justice, and Motor Officer.

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4. (C) Operations.

a. Disposition of the units at the beginning of the reporting period was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Batteries	Cu Chi (XT 644 146)
Battery A	Xuan Loc (YT 466 088)
Battery B	Lai Khe (XT 756 373)
Battery C (-)	Tay Ninh (XT 167 521)
Battery C (175mm platoon)	Cu Chi (XT 644 146)

b. Batteries A and B were composite (8 inch howitzer/175mm gun) batteries and Battery C was equipped entirely with 175mm guns. On 23 December Battery C replaced two 175mm gun tubes with two 8 inch howitzer tubes.

c. On 20 December 1966 Battery A started its relocation from Xuan Loc to Cu Chi (XT 644 146), the firing battery closing at 201402 and the remaining element at 231800. Security for both elements was provided by four quad 50 machine gun sections from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery.

d. No battalion sized operations were conducted during the reporting period.

e. Other Operations.

(1) During the period 8 - 19 November 1966, Battery C (-) was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and occupied firing position vicinity Soui Da (XT 345 586) in support of Operation ATTLEBORO. On 16-17 November 1966 the mission was changed to GSR, 1st Infantry Division.

(2) During the period 15 - 19 November 1966, 175mm platoon, Battery C, occupied firing position vicinity Soui Da (XT 345 586) in support of Operation ATTLEBORO. Platoon mission was GSR 25th Infantry Division. Upon termination of Operation ATTLEBORO the platoon moved with the battery to its present location at Tay Ninh.

(3) During the period 26 - 30 December 1966, 8 inch platoon, Battery C, occupied firing position at coordinates XT 357 429 in support of a search and destroy operation conducted by 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The battery's tactical mission did not change.

(4) During the period 5 - 24 January 1967, Battery A occupied a

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firing position vicinity Trung Lap (XT 587 215) in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The battery's mission was GSR 25th Infantry Division Artillery. 8

(5) During the period 8 - 17 January 1967, Battery B occupied firing positions at coordinates XT 723 353 and XT 659 310, the latter position in the middle of the "Iron Triangle", in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The battery's mission was Reinforcing 1st Infantry Division Artillery. For this operation the battery was made a four 8 inch howitzer battery by exchanging two entire 175mm sections for two 8 inch howitzer sections with Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

(6) During the period 13 - 15 January 1967, 8 inch platoon, Battery A, occupied firing position at coordinate XS 770 936 in support of Capitol Military District operations to destroy fortified installations. The platoon returned to this location on 25 January and remains there at the present time.

(7) During the period 17 - 25 January 1967, Battery B located at Lai Khe base camp continued to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. The battery's mission changed to GSR 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery. On 17 January 1967 the battery reverted to composite (175mm/8 inch) weapons.

(8) On 24 January the 8 inch howitzer platoon from C Battery displaced to XT 299 568 to support two operations on Nui Ba Den. All missions were direct fire with the mission of destroying bunkers and tunnels.

f. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

UNIT	NO OF MSNS FIRED	AMMO EXPENDED	
		8 inch	175 mm
Battery A	2309	2577	2537
Battery B	3680	6121	2782
Battery C	3128	2468	5017

g. A preliminary Annual General Inspection was conducted by Headquarters, II Field Force on 7 - 10 November 1966.

h. During the period 19 - 23 December 1966 the battalion received the Annual General Inspection from USARV, obtaining an overall rating of noteworthy.

5. (C) Logistics.

a. Transportation. Utilization of roads by the Battalion ammunition train to resupply units with ammunition from the Long Binh ASP was very heavy during the quarter. During the month of November the ammunition train was away from the unit twenty-five (25) days, in December twenty-eight (28) days and in January fifteen (15) days. The decrease in January is due to the relocation of units and the establishment of temporary ASPs in the Cu Chi and Lai Khe areas.

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b. Supply Operations. The following items considered combat essential were not received during the reporting period:

ITEM	DOCUMENT #	FOLLOWED UP ON	STATUS
TRUCK, 2½ ton, w/wn, 11 ea	AT 8149-6265- 7732	6364	BL - Okinawa
TRUCK, 2½ ton, wo/wn, 3 ea.	AT 8149-6265- 7733	6364	BL - Okinawa
TRUCK, TANK, 2½ ton, Fuel Servicing, 1 ea	AT 8149-6139- 7300	6364	BL - Okinawa
TRUCK, 5 ton, w/wn, 1 ea.	AT 8149-6341- 7581	6364	BL - Okinawa
GENERATOR, PE75, 1 ea	AT 8149-6063- 3211	6364	BL - Okinawa
GENERATOR, 3KW, 8 ea	AT 8149-6097- 8388	6364	BL - Okinawa

c. Maintenance.

(1) Availability of critical repair parts for the M107 and M110 has remained the same as the last report. The average down time has remained at 2 - 3 days.

(2) During the reporting period this unit has received numerous visits from ordnance technicians from the 185th Maintenance Battalion and 29th General Support Group. All visits have proven to be beneficial.

(3) The ladder rammer system has become less of a problem during this period but difficulties are still being encountered due to the non availability of parts.

(4) Maintenance down time during the reporting period:

(a) M107 175mm gun

1. Possible days 644

2. Non available days 39

3. Deadline rate 6%

(b) M110 8 inch Howitzer

1. Possible days 460

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2. Non available days 28

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3. Deadline rate 6%

(c) The following parts for both weapon systems have caused the most down time:

1. Hydraulic motors

2. Traversing Mechanisms (gears & housing)

3. Replacing tubes (M107)

4. Cracked spades.

(d) Twenty-one tubes were changed. Each change required two hours.

SECTION II

PART I, OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

ITEM: Voluntary Tour of Duty Extension.

a. DISCUSSION: Shortly after the beginning of this reporting period, Public Law 39-735 was approved authorizing a special 30-day leave to military members who, by voluntary action, extend their required tour of duty in RVN for at least six months. Since its inception, the program has met with outstanding interest in this command. To date, some twenty-six individuals have taken advantage of this extension opportunity and the prospects of even more volunteers appear good.

b. OBSERVATION: The voluntary extension program has been successful in this command. It appears that the increasing interest in the program will do much in alleviating inherent MOS shortages and lack of continuity associated with personnel rotations.

2. (S) Intelligence

ITEM: Areas of responsibility for visual reconnaissance.

a. DISCUSSION: The visual reconnaissance program was modified by assigning new areas of responsibility. The new areas are bounded, for the most part, by terrain features. This facilitates observation by individual

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// observers by enabling them to more easily identify their assigned zones. The policy of assigning each observer one area was continued. This allows an observer to learn his area and to note minor changes.

b. OBSERVATION: Partitioning of visual reconnaissance areas of responsibility by terrain features is highly desirable. Further, the assignment of distinct areas to specific observers is essential.

3. (C) Training and Organization.

a. ITEM: Survey Training.

(1) DISCUSSION: The battalion survey team has been training in methods of extending survey control rapidly with the aid of a helicopter. Two known points are used to locate each of three positions occupied by the helicopter, each position having been sighted upon by the station to be located. Three point resection is then used to extend control to the unknown point. A slightly faster method is for the helicopter to hover over the point to be located. At a designated time readings are taken from two known points and a weight is dropped from the helicopter. The point where the weight strikes the ground is then assumed to be the same as the location of the helicopter at the instant readings were taken. A third method, and the only one tried as of this date, utilizes a radar unit to locate the three points used for resection instead of using two known points. This proved to be unsatisfactory because of the inaccuracy of range determination by the RAWIN AN/GMD-1.

(2) OBSERVATION: The methods described above are valid for initial use, but should be followed by more accurate means. The use of the RAWIN AN/GMD-1 is not warranted. The training benefits derived from the other two methods fully justify the continuation of this type training.

b. ITEM: Direct fire with 175mm guns.

(1) DISCUSSION: The 175mm gun was used in direct fire using fuze quick with all three zones. Personnel benefitted from this in that they were made aware that the 175mm gun could, in fact, be used in a direct fire role.

(2) OBSERVATION: The 175mm gun may be used in a direct fire role when necessary. Zone 3 should be used for direct fire.

c. ITEM: Composition of heavy artillery batteries.

(1) DISCUSSION: During the early stages of the participation of U.S. troop units in Republic of Vietnam, flexibility was given to heavy artillery units by organizing composite 8 inch howitzer/175mm gun batteries. This provided a long range H & I program to be undertaken while simultaneously possessing the destruction capability offered by the 8 inch howitzers. With the influx of U.S. units and the increase in density of heavy artillery, it

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becomes less of a requirement for a single battery to have a dual role. Where two composite batteries are located near each other, it would appear desirable for each to have a separate caliber weapon. Operations outside of base camp normally require a battery with the same caliber weapons. At present, units are required to temporarily reconfigure when supporting specific operations. This reconfiguration is not desirable since it is during a tactical operation that a unit should be at its peak in efficiency, whereas the reconfiguration requires units to operate with unfamiliar personnel or materiel.

(2) OBSERVATION: Increased density of heavy artillery and increased requirements to support tactical operations decrease the requirement for composite heavy artillery batteries and enhance the value of batteries with weapons of the same caliber.

4. (C) Operations.

a. ITEM: Availability of track recovery vehicles.

(1) DISCUSSION: It is necessary to have a track recovery vehicle accompany track vehicle convoys. It is difficult to properly support the three widely separated units with the 2 recovery vehicles on hand. Furthermore, for the frequent tube changes and off loading of ammunition it is necessary to have a lifting capability at each battery location. This is provided by the 2 track recovery vehicles and a 5 ton wrecker.

(2) OBSERVATION: The disposition and use of the two track recovery vehicles must be carefully controlled and closely coordinated by the battalion maintenance and operations sections.

b. ITEM: Wooden Gun Pads.

(1) DISCUSSION: Four wooden gun pads were constructed in November at Tay Ninh. These have proven to be very satisfactory from the standpoint of providing a stable firing platform and of facilitating maintenance. The maintenance problem is eased in that the wooden pad keeps the weapon relatively free from dirt and mud. However, the priority for building materials has not been high enough to permit construction of pads at other firing batteries.

(2) OBSERVATION: Wooden pads have proven their value and the construction is well worth the time and effort involved. Advantage should be taken of the dry season (December - March) to complete construction.

c. ITEM: Use of light air defense automatic weapon units.

(1) DISCUSSION: The M42, Duster, and the truck-mounted quad 50 have been used for security of convoys and position areas. The firepower made available to units by the presence of these weapons have materially improved the effectiveness of security. The mobility of each type weapon

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has enabled them to be used for convoy security.

(2) OBSERVATION: The use of the light air defense automatic weapons in a ground role has proven to be extremely effective.

5. (C) Logistics.

ITEM: Ammunition Resupply.

a. DISCUSSION: The extensive use of the battalion ammunition train vehicles in ammunition resupply operations has, in addition to exposing personnel and equipment to enemy activities, hindered the proper and timely accomplishment of scheduled vehicular maintenance. A partial solution to the problem has been found by rotating vehicles and/or by having a mechanic accompany the ammunition convoy.

b. OBSERVATION: The establishment of heavy artillery ammunition resupply points near firing batteries is the best solution to the problem.

SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel and Administration.

NONE

2. Intelligence.

NONE

3. (C) Training and Organization.

Consideration be given to organizing and training additional light air defense automatic weapon units for deployment in Republic of Vietnam with increased emphasis on use in the ground role.

4. Operations.

NONE

5. (C) Logistics.

a. Priorities for wooden gun pad materials be reconsidered in view of the demonstrated effectiveness of the pads and the importance of completing them during the dry season.

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
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1 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

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b. That heavy artillery ammunition supply points be established for firing batteries in outlying base camps rather than requiring the battalions to be responsible for their resupply.


PHILIP D. HAISLEY
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289,
17 February 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery is approved.

2. (C) Section II, Part I, para 3c. Concur with the basic concept. However, the density of batteries is insufficient at this time to permit return to one caliber batteries. Reconfiguration required on rare occasion by the tactical situation does cause short, temporary disruptions to the smooth functioning of a battery. These are considered insignificant.

3. Section II, Part I, para 4a. Both heavy battalions of the Group have submitted USARV Forms 47-R with valid requisitions for these vehicles which were approved by USARV on the basis of one per firing battery. The 6th Bn, 27th Arty has received issue on three of these vehicles. The S4, 2d Bn, 32d Arty was instructed by this Hq to follow-up on his requisition more than 60 days ago and this action disclosed no record in supply channels. Requisitions with appropriate justification were resubmitted by the Bn on 31 Jan 67 thru G4 IIFFV and returned to this Hq on 9 Feb 67. These documents with additional information were again submitted thru S4 IIFFVA on 19 Feb 67 and are pending final action.

4. Section II, Part I, para 4b and Section II, Part II, para 5a. Request for construction of heavy artillery firing pads was initially submitted by this Hq 20 Sep 66. The 79th Engineer Group (Construction) published Construction Directive 66-9-79, dated 30 September 66, stating that all work would be completed by 15 Dec 66. Although this target date was not met, construction of these pads are now progressing at all firing battery locations of this Group except A/2/32 (Cu Chi) for which neither materials nor Engineer (588th Engr Bn) assistance has been provided. Every effort should be made to provide the materials for these four (4) remaining pads to 2d Bn, 32d Arty (Cu Chi) without further delay in order that immediate construction can be initiated upon final relocation of A/2/32. Both the 79th Engineer Group (Construction) and 588th Engineer Battalion (Cu Chi Post) have been frequently queried on the availability of the material (FONECON OPNS Officer 79th Engr Gp) and they continue to report that materials are not available.

5. Section II, Part I, para 5 and Section II, Part II, para 5b. Resupply of heavy artillery Class V to the widely separated and in some instances isolated firing batteries of the group remains a major problem area. The 1st Logistical Command is now studying a request submitted by this Hq dated 30 November 1966 for the establishment of forward ASPs at some of the more isolated locations i.e., Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi, Lai Khe and Cu Chi. Resupply of this ammunition from 3d Ordnance Depot at Long Binh continues to overtax the

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
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

organic cargo vehicle assets of this Group. The convoys to the more isolated locations such as Phouc Vinh and Quan Loi are currently conducted once each six to eight weeks. This requires that all available vehicles of all Group units be utilized. When the vehicles are returned to the respective battalions they still must conduct individual supply and ammunition resupply operations to their more accessible units. This method of operation causes these vehicles to be constantly on the road which greatly reduces the available organizational maintenance time and directly results in excessive vehicle failures and downtime. If ASPs as requested cannot be established, then it was requested that unit distribution of Class V be effected to locations outlined above or that assistance be provided from assets of Saigon Transportation Office, which has been extremely limited in the past.

6. Section II, Part II, para 3. Concur with need for more forward area air defense automatic weapons units for ground role employment.



THOMAS H. SAYES
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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